Allen Steele Not a program, but a frontier
As irony would have it, I was in the SF section of a bookstore when
I heard on National Public Radio that the "Columbia" had been
destroyed. My immediate thought, oddly
enough, was that this was a dramatization of some sort
-- a latter-day "War of the Worlds," minus Orson Welles and the
Mercury Theatre -- until I realized
that, no, this was reality of the worst kind. I
got in my car and raced home, and turned on CNN just in time to
catch the first amateur video footage of the shuttle breaking up over
Texas.
In hindsight, it was bound to happen sooner or later. However the
investigation of its causes may turn out, the fact remains that
"Columbia" was built near 25 years ago, and
that quite a few people were aware of its vulnerabilities. Many space
advocates, along with the NASA leadership, had
been lobbying for funds for the construction of a
second-generation spacecraft, yet Congress
had procrastinated. And now it's too late; we're stuck with an aging
shuttle fleet that's been temporarily grounded.
If the United States is going to remain a spacefaring nation, then
we're going to have to take it much more seriously than we have in the
recent past. We need to establish long-range
objectives, invest in new technologies, and provide funding that isn't
merely stable but instead progressive. We need to stop thinking of
space as being a "program" but rather as a frontier. We need to stop
being complacent. With any luck, the
destruction of America's first space shuttle and the loss of its crew
will be a turning point. I certainly hope so.
Elizabeth Moon Aspirations
What I hope from any space program (not limiting
"space program" to NASA) is that it gets the human race out into
space. If a lot of people didn't think this was a desirable and
possible goal, we wouldn't have made it this far. If a larger
segment of the population saw it as a desirable and possible goal,
we'd be a lot farther. For continued and increased investment in
space exploration, we need continued and increased popular
support--which means understanding what motivates people to be
interested in, and supportive of, manned space programs.
As with any exploration, there are two types of
problems: discovering how to do it, and getting the financial backing
for it. Explorers are self-motivated; you don't have to bribe
natural-born explorers to go into space any more than you have to
bribe them to go into caves or up mountains or down to Antarctica.
But they aren't, in modern times, the people who invent and then build
all the specialized equipment they need: mountaineers don't make their
own ropes, carabiners, crampons, etc. Test pilots didn't build the
planes, not past the very earliest days of flight. They rely on the
technical expertise of a different kind of personality. Nor are
explorers the kind of people who acquire the wealth to put together
their own orbiters and space stations, any more than they financed
their own round-the-world voyages in the great days of naval
exploration. They need sponsors, governmental or other.
Exploration--particularly in areas that require a
lot of technology--requires a huge flow of resources to make it
happen. Returns are delayed and unpredictable. Those who support
the exploration must find ways to motivate both the engineers who
develop the necessary technology and the deep pockets who will fund
it.
What has always motivated human expansion? Greed
and fear. We may see these as negative motivators, unworthy carrots
and sticks for so great an enterprise, but they have sent more
explorers, pioneers, colonists around the world than any more noble
intention. The greed may appear as the desire for fame, prestige,
wealth, power...or just the desire for a new personal experience.
Fear may be fear of a rival's success, of lost opportunities, of some
bad situation (existing or foreseen) in the original setting.
Through many variations on the theme, people move out of their
accustomed ruts either to get something better, or escape something
bad.
So gaining the broad public interest and support
for manned space exploration will depend on understanding why people
are now interested, what motivates them, and then ensuring that these
motivations are included in the planning, that satisfying these
motivations is considered a legitimate goal. If you ask people now
supportive of the manned space programs what they want, many if not
most want to go into space themselves. While scientists and
politicians may turn up their noses at the thought of 'space tourism',
the fact is that there's a market for trips to space. And it's also a
fact that the more individuals go into space, the more interest and
support has been raised. Humans are human-centered; they are
interested in what humans are doing. Send more people into space and
more will want to go, and more will support going.
Michael Swanwick
something to
offend everybody on both sides of the aisle
The space enterprise – by which I mean not just the American program,
but those of the Russians, the Europeans, the Chinese, and whoever
else wants to play – is the one undeniably glorious enterprise of our
otherwise rather drab and mean-spirited times. It would be a crime
against the human spirit to give up on it.
That said, the space shuttle is a cow. It's too big and too awkward
and too prone to blundering into trouble. A NASA spokesman,
responding to criticism, explained that nobody could have examined the
shuttle's exterior for potential damage while it was in orbit because
it didn't carry the jet backpacks an EVA would have required. Well,
dammit, as any engineer in the world could have told them, it
should have carried jet backpacks – and spare tiles, and a really
good toolkit for making emergency repairs, as well. But the NASA
administration is so rigid that they won't make allowances for
anything other than what they've programmed to happen. Currently
their plan is simply to keep flying the shuttle for at least another
decade, though less frequently and with one craft decommissioned for
spare parts.
Maybe it's time that the National Air and Space Administration was
broken up into smaller competing organizations, the way Bell Telephone
was. A half-dozen baby NASAs competing with each other for the
funding and the glory would have the incentive to build the smaller,
safer, and more economical spacecraft that the job requires. It would
be an awful mess for years to come. But since,
seventeen
years after the Challenger disaster, NASA hasn't acted on the
recommendations made then, the alternative seems to be just more of
the same.
Still... not that anybody's ever
going to ask me... I'd go tomorrow.
Statesmen of Space
These voices speak with
indisputable authority, all serving or having served, on national
committees about spaceflight, and one a former NASA engineer.